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RESTRICTED 
THE ARMED FORCES AND PUBLIC INFORMATION 
IN WAR AND PEACE 
A lecture delivered by 
Mr. Erwin D. Canham 
at the Naval War College 
May 6, 1948 
It isn't really necessary to take much time to seek to prove 
the importance of public information and a sound public informa­
tion program. I don't know that we Americans have learned the 
significance of public information as quickly or perhaps even as 
completely as some of our enemies. A good deal has come to light 
in the last decade about public information and its uses-a good 
deal that is revealing and very important. As an illustration, the 
diary of the notorius Dr. Goebbels, which has quite recently been 
published, is filled with revealing tips as to the power of propa­
ganda. 
I shall seek throughout everything I have to say to make 
clear and to emphasize the great and profound difference between 
a public relations program in a democracy and one in a dictator­
ship. In a democracy one responds to the right of the people to 
know certain things, and the attitude is one of opportunity between 
the official and the public-while in a dictatorship public informa­
tion is used as an unscrupulous and ruthless tool of thought con­
trol. The fact that public information can be used as an extremely 
powerful weapon of thought control indicates that it is a subject 
which can no longer be safely ignored. Since dictatorships have · 
always recognized and used public information as a frankly con­
fessed weapon it behooves us to think it out more carefully and see 
Mr. Canham is Editor of the "Christian Science Monitor," and Vice 
President of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. 
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wherein a sound program of public relations is an important as­
set and a valuable instrument in attaining definite objectives. 
I mentioned Dr. Goebbels and his diary. Dr. Goebbels has 
an extreme sensitiveness to words. For example, shortly after 
Hitler came to power in Germany Dr. Goebbels saw to it that the 
word "assassination" never appeared in the German press. So 
fin(;lly drawn was this concept of propaganda and of thought con­
trol that Dr. Goebbels, as one of the great experts in the field, 
decided that the mere publication of the word "assassination" was 
contrary to the Nazi interest. 
Perhaps the greatest illustration of the use of public in­
formation as a powerful weapon is the illustration of the Soviet 
Union today. It is quite obvious that the Russians are afraid of 
information; they are afraid of any ideas, any set of facts which 
may, to any degree, challenge their approved doctrine. The Iron 
Curtain around the Soviet Union is the result and it grows higher 
and higher with every passing week. The fear-inspired efforts 
to plug every possible loop-hole in that barrier get more intensive 
with every passing week. 
I recently spent a month in Geneva in rather arduous ne­
gotiations with the Soviet Union and it was perfectly obvious to 
me that some of the best talent and most profound study in the 
Soviet Union is being devoted to the problem of thought control 
in the effort to isolate and insulate the Soviet Union from any 
\ 
sort of infiltration of ideas from the outside world. You prob-
� 
ably know that right now a purge is going on in Moscow-a 
purge of all individuals who have had any contact whatsoever 
with the West. One by one, individuals who have had some con-
tact with the West are being removed from positions of res-
ponsibility. They are being sent somewhere east of the Urals or 
to th.e salt mines or some such place where even their slight contact 
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with the West will not contaminate the remainder of the popula­
tion with ideas which may be alien and somewhat challenging 
to the approved doS!trine. That purge is going on. Our corres­
pondent reports to us of the steady progress of this effort to 
weed out everybody who has been in contact with the West. 
You may remember that at one time the Red Army took 
over a rest hotel in Karlsbad where general officers were per­
mitted to go and enjoy the waters. It was decided some months 
ago that Karlsbad was too dangerous, too far west, for even a 
general officer to sojourn and so the rest hotel at Karlsbad was 
closed. This is just a further indication of the recognition which 
is being given to the field of public information. It should 
awaken us more fully than ever before to the importance of un­
derstanding the potentialities in this field. 
This is not a field which Americans take to with any de­
gree of satisfaction or ease. I doubt very much if many men in 
this room would greatly relish plunging into the task of handling 
publicity. I could be wrong, but it is my feeling that we are in­
stinctively repelled by the effort to try to control people's thinking. 
My major thesis is that we do not have to get into the 
position and the attitude of Dr. Goebbels or of any other totalitar­
ian manipulator of public thinking; that there is a different basis, 
a different formula, and a different concept and relationship which 
can be worke<J out in a representative government which can be 
• maintained and carried through with complete dignity, propriety
and self respect; that this can be carried through in an atmosphere
in which we are never seeking to soften up the other man's thinking
or his right to think, but in which we are responsive to his need to
know the largest possible area of fact, truth, and sound doctrine.
This is of course an age of publicity, not only in the totali-
11 
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tarian states but in our own. It is a brash new world of pub­
licity and we have to find out how to live in it. We might as well 
conclude that the newspaper, the radio and the P. R. 0., like the 
automobile, are here to stay. Instead of kicking against any irk­
some and irritating attributes of this weapon, we should learn 
better how to use it. I assure you that this is a study that will pay 
dividends as many have already discovered. 
I should like to make it clear, near the outset, that news­
paper men, people on our side of the fence so to speak, have a 
very great deal to learn. We have to accept new obligations of res­
ponsibility in these very troublesome days. There is (and every 
candid newspaper man will recognize it) far too much irres­
ponsibility on the side of the press. We work for the most part 
under a considerable handicap, a handicap that goes all the way 
back to events which took place in the Garden of Eden. The 
human mind is more interested in conflict, in disaster, in sensa­
tion, and in scandal, than in constructive, sound, forward-looking 
and sometimes unexciting developments. 
For the most part, publicity is built upon conflict and 
sensation and for this reason newspapers are more or less in a 
constant battle with their better selves. They are aware of the 
ways in which it is possible to cater to this human desire for 
sensation and scandal, conflict and disaster. At the same time 
every newspaper editor knows that he has a responsibility to the 
people-the responsibility to try to tell the truth. The acceptance 
of this responsibility and the setting of higher standards, I think, 
has made some progress within the American press. However 
the fact remains that in conducting public relations activities one 
must deal with an activity in which there is a premium on con­
flict, revelation of secrets, trash, scandal, and sensation. It is 
important to help newspapers rise above these imperatives which 
tend to drag them down. It is important to help newspapers 
12 
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carry through the responsibility which they owe to the public, to 
the nation, to the well-being of all. 
It is also true in many respects and with few exceptions 
that newspapers and radios live in abysmal ignorance of the 
Armed Forces. This means that the public is almost equally in 
such abysmal ignorance. 
Ignorance is a constant danger; ignorance is the weapon 
of totalitarianism. Iron Curtains are always a greater danger 
to the power seeking to hide behind them than they are to anyone 
else. I believe Iron Curtains more often hide weakness than 
strength. Perhaps some of you can confirm this statement from 
personal observation. 
About a little over a year ago when I was in Japan, I was 
taken by Capt. Decker down to Yokosuka to visit the former Jap­
anese naval base there. Captain Decker and other officers made 
it very clear to me that the tremendous wall of secrecy which 
the Japanese built about that particular spot hid weakness rather 
than strength and that the stories which we had heard during the 
thirties of vast dreadnaughts and of other great developments 
being worked out in the Japanese shipyards were, to a large ex­
tent, myths which had been able to come into being, spawn and 
flourish behind walls of ignorance. Therefore, obviously, these 
Iron Curtains of ignorance are in a sense a greater danger to the 
person who is seeking to erect and maintain them than they are 
to the rest of us • 
Of course it is necessary sometimes, in an emergency, to 
hide weakness. Everybody recognizes the necessity for the right 
forms of censorship in wartime and for the concealment of mili­
tary secrets in peacetime. There is a tendency for censorship 
to become habit forming and for information which could break 
13 
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down public ignorance to be held up long after the need for 
secrecy. There have been violations, gross and grave violations, 
of what should have been a patriotic obligation not to print. I 
think those violations will be fewer and the right relationship will 
be maintained if every responsible officer in the armed services is 
prepared to weigh the legitimate need for secrecy against the 
legitimate need of the public to know. More often than not, 
ignorance is the greatest danger of all. Public participation, pub­
lic partnership, is a great good in itself. which must. be achieved
in the largest possible degree.· 
The armed services are part of the public services of the 
nation which means that ·an officer in the armed services is a 
public servant and like other public servants he must accept as a 
part of his public obligation the duty of giving an account of 
himself to the public. This is done through proper channels, 
in a proper way and through such media of ultimate expression 
as the press, the radio and so on. The more accurately and the 
more fully the public understands the goal and the performance 
of the armed services, the more whole heartedly will the public 
support those services. Particularly in these precarious times, 
it is desperately important for the public to understand the 
precise role of the armed services. All this means that today, 
more than ever before in peacetime, it is necessary for the armed 
services to study the duty, the opportunity and the technique of 
public relations. 
More than once during the recent war, several of these 
three qualities were not adequately recognized. We did see an 
enormous expansion of technique during the war. Public relations 
officers blossomed everywhere but their mere existence is far from 
enough. Some of the worst crimes against public information, 
some of the greatest damage to the armed services themselves and 
to individual officers was done by public relations officers who 
14 
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misunderstood and misapplied their energies. Conversely, some 
of the best public information work was done not by public re­
lations officers but by professional officers who had grasped the 
duty and opportunity of a public relations program. 
We have come a very long way from the exasperated of­
' ficer, early in the last war, who once declared at a Washington 
cocktail party, speaking of war correspondents, "I wouldn't tell 
them anything until the war was over and then I'd tell them 
who won." This is a natural enough feeling and one can sym­
pathize with it, particularly if one has known some war corres­
pondents. Nevertheless strength comes from the people and the 
ultimate strength of the Armed Services will rest upon the de­
gree of public support. Public relations technique can be stymied 
if there is not a recognition, from the top on down, of the duty of 
keeping the public informed. ' I wish to quote an eloquent para­
graph recognizing this duty and put into excellent words by Lt. 
General Collins, now Deputy Chief of Staff. This paragraph 
says what I think we all agree on; forgive me if it is covered 
in terms of the Army: 
"Responsibility of the Army is to make sure that 
the public has real information on which to base sound 
evaluation of it's Army. The Army has nothing to hide 
and nothing to fear if it recognizes the public as a partner, 
as well as a boss; if it ignores the captious critic and 
assumes that public confidence is there for the making. 
But it cannot expect that confidence unless it is deserved. 
The individual soldier, commissioned and enlisted, is res­
ponsible for seeing that it is deserved. It �s the responsi-
bility of the Commander to see to it that his officers and 
men conduct themselves in the manner that will win the 
public esteem and that the military establishment has 
the high professional standards expected of it by the pub­
lic. It is the job of the public relations officer to assist 
the Commander .in cementing this partnership with the 
15 
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public by providing accurate, full, and unbiased· informa­
tion and by interpreting the profession of arms to a nation 
which is eager to be proud of its armed srvices." 
That is the basic relationship which needs to be understood and 
carried out. 
I had personal contact with a good deal of public relations 
work in the last war and it is my impression that the very best 
public relations work was done at the top. I had the opportun­
ity during the war of sitting in on informal conferences with 
Admiral King and General Marshall. Both of these men did a 
superb job of discussing with our group (which was representa­
tive of the nation's editors) the state of affairs, the problems 
which arose, difficulties and so on. To my knowledge there was 
no instance of any violation of their confidence. 
The best public refations. work can be done at the top and 
the tone can be set which will permeate the entire service. If it 
, is continuously recognized that the greatest possible achievement 
is to get close· to the people, then the public relations program 
will be on a sound basis. I don't know whether it is worthwhile 
to go into any post-mortems of some of the public relations work 
of the last. war. In preparation for this talk I asked half a dozen 
of the members of our staff who were themselves either public 
relations officers, several of them in the Navy, or who were war 
correspondents, to give me memoranda analyzing the problem as 
they had seen it in action during the second World War. They 
gave me some very hard-hitting and candid answers. 
They support the point that I have been making, that the 
main thing is to get underneath the psychology which would 
naturally prefer to fight a war in private. Secrecy is an im­
portant part of war. You deal properly here, day in and day 
out, with classified documents and information, confidential and 
secret material. In the nature of things you may be more ac-
16 
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customed and more indoctrinated with concealing than with re­
vealing. That point of view, which is entirely proper and sound, 
has to be reconsidered in relationship to the problem of public 
'information. You are trained to think accurately, precisely and 
scientifically. The average newspaper writer is not necessarily 
trained to think in quite that same way. He is trained to in­
terest the public. Hence there is not a natural meeting of minds 
between men trained as you are and men who are trained as 
newspaper men. That gulf has to be bridged. It can be 
bridged if it is realized that along side this duty of secrecy,' 
which should never be breached, is the positive advantage of 
letting the public know everything that it can know safely. The 
advantage of an informed public has to be weighed against the 
precaution taken by not giving out information. It is a little bit 
like the relationship of sins of commission and omission. There 
is a natural inhibition against letting information out unless there 
is some positive reason for it or unless the information is perfect­
,ly innocuous. That attitude must be studied and re.;.examined in 
the light of the importance of an informed public. 
There was a revolution in public relations during the last 
war. Our men who were both public relations officers and war 
correspondents agree that in late '44 and '45 the expansion of 
public relations in the Pacific was on the whole a very healthy 
and important decision. The gratitude of the press to the men 
who were responsible for that expansion and revolution in policy 
is great. It was, however, an uphill job. 
I want to outline the elements of a constructive public re­
lations program. First, establish a general concept, from the 
Naval Academy on up, that it is important for the public to un­
,derstand that information is a precious asset to be used con­
structively and advantageously. It is important to have the at.;. 
17 
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titude, not of constant desire to hold everything back, but of 
responsiveness to the opportunity of public relations which pro­
duces an instinctively right public relations program. We have 
to get back to fundamental thinking in a responsible government 
and to realize that the support of the public is, as I have said 
so often, the most precious and valuable asset that can be had. 
The second element is to establish clearly the distinction 
between information and propaganda. I think one of the worst 
curses which ran through our public relations program, particular­
ly during the war, was a sort of shame-faced feeling on the 
part of responsible officers that they were really being called 
upon to become propagandists and they didn't like being propa­
gandists. This instinctive American abhorrence for propaganda, 
and an out-and-out dislike for the word is sound and right. No 
one should be called upon to become a propagandist and no one en­
gaged in public relations work should shoulder the inferiority 
complex of thinking that he is a propagandist. There doesn't have 
to be any propaganda to it. The problem is simply one of an open 
channel of information between the services and the people. I 
think the curse, the feeling that one is a propagandist, came into 
being especially when adverse and disagreeable news had to be 
handled. That need not be the case at all. Responsiveness is the 
keynote. A relationship, a bond, a link, a channel, between the 
services and the public is the keynote. Responsibility, not pro­
motion or propaganda is the basic word. 
Don't worry too much about adverse publicity on stories 
which are technically incorrect or seem to be undesirable. It 
wouldn't do much harm if officers who are forced in this mael­
strom of public relations could get some of the psychological at­
titude of the politician. The successful politician, as you all know, 
has a hide as thick as an elephant and only starts worrying when 
18 
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he doesn't get into the headlines. An adverse headline is regard­
ed as just as much of an asset as a favorable headline. The im­
portant thing is that the politician has to be talked about, to be 
in the news-not forgotten. You remember the advertising cam­
paign which went on for a good many years warning people of 
the horrors of pink tooth-brush. The campaign was finally 
abandoned partly because so many people kept going into drug 
stores and asking to buy a pink toothbrush. 
This really proves the point that confused public concepts 
do build up but in spite of this it is important to have the public 
aware of the Navy and of its basic problems. The public will not 
always be as wrong as the pink toothbrush people were. I have, 
and I think probably you all have, a rather profound belief in the 
fact that public opinion balances up; that while any number of in­
dividuals may be wrong, there is a certain fundamental righ�ness 
in the general will and in the general direction of the popular opin­
ion when at least a minimum of information gets to the people. 
So I say it is important not to be too sensitive, too meticulous, or too 
fussy about the things one gets into in this public relations business, 
but emulate the hard-boiled old politicians. I have never heard 
Mayor Curley of Boston complain although nine-tenths of his pub­
licity in the last 25 years has been seemingly adverse. The old 
scoundrel knows that any publicity has a certain value. This is 
a pretty cynical view I know, gentlemen, but you are up against 
a profession which has to deal with popularization. 
It is necessary to study the techniques ()f public relations 
and to be in touch with experts in the profession as the situation 
requires. There is a wide diversity of opinion as to the techniques 
of public relations. It is not a scientific professon with every­
thing worked out on a slide rule basis but at the same time 
there are experts. Newspaper men are not, by any means, always 
19 
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the best experts in the field; there is a difference between the 
role of the reporter and the role of the public relations officer. 
One of the most successful public relations officers in the service 
of the American government, Mike McDermott, of the State De­
partment, has been at the business for over a quarter century. 
He was never a newspaper man. As a matter of fact, Mike start­
ed out as a stenographer and began to absorb, by some kind of 
osmosis, the necessary relationship between the press and the gov­
ernment service. 
As I said, many other newspaper reporters who have tried 
to do the same thing have failed because of the difference be­
tween the public relations relationship and the reporter's relation­
ship with the press. However, there is a technique and it is being 
studied and developed to a degree. Progress fa being made in re­
ducing this to terms which may be studied and comprehended by 
people coming in from the outside. 
But this technique is tremendously subordimrte to attitudes. 
One basic attitude is the value of maintaining contacts, of getting 
close to newspaper men and keeping close to them. I emphasize 
that it is valuable to maintain this contact at the highest level pos­
sible and to add plenty of follow-through at lower levels. If you 
·do have contact with the newspaper men, friendships and relation­
ships, social and informal contacts, then I think you will begin to
understand more clearly the viewpoint of the newspaper man. You
will understand that his job is the task of popularizing things, of
getting into people's thinking, and you may soften up some of your
quite natural indignation at the over-simplification of problems. It
is a very difficult thing to convert a technical subject to terms the
public can readily understand. There are bound to be errors, lack
of precise and explicit qualifying remarks, in every popularized
account but it is a problem we cannot get around and have to
20 
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accept. A lot of this publicity will be repulsive to the expert but, 
nevertheless, it does serve a useful purpose in getting through to 
public thinking. 
I strongly recommend the habit of press conferences when­
ever there is any need and opportunity. It is even possible to come 
to enjoy press conferences after a certain amount of experience 
with them. 
I have already referred to the importance of understanding 
the viewpoint of newspapers. Newspapers cannot escape the ob­
ligation of popularizing material, the duty of holding public in­
terest. This need for popularizing is terribly overdone and abused 
but we are dealing with the people who will decide the pattern of 
national defense in the United States. We must inform and edu­
cate them. We cannot ignore them; we cannot permit them to 
remain in the shadow of ignorance which has frequently surround­
ed them. This goes pretty deep. The difference between our­
selves and our enemies in this world is probably best. defined as 
the differnce between a nation which respects the individual as the 
most important element and value within the nation and one which 
declares the individual to be valueless and the state to be all im­
portant and all powerful. 
The only way totalitarian states can maintain their hold on 
the people, can make their force actually operative, is to control, 
to destroy the independent thinking of their people. By allo�­
ing public expression there is bound to be conflict and diversity 
of thinking. This was the primary issue at. our conference on 
Freedom of Information at Geneva. The great cleavage between 
the Ea.stern Bloc and ourselves was this: they believe in one single 
set of ideas, imposed by force, which is infiltrated into the people's 
thinking by artful devices, subtle techniques and ruthless re­
pressions----in short, by complete thought control; while to us 
21 
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· strength comes from diversity and a belief that all progress comes
from the conflict of ideas.
This basic principle of diversity, of conflict, of growth 
through the stress or strain of ideas meeting in healthy conflict, 
we believe will produce strength. I think that by taking a long 
historic viewpoint the germs of weakness contained within the 
totalitarian system are those which have wiped out genuine self­
criticism; whereas with us, self-criticism and conflict of ideas pro­
duce a healthy organism which goes forward, revises its ideas, im­
proves its ideas, and carries them ahead. 
The relationship of that principle with the press is this: 
You will encounter a diversity in publications and a diversity of 
treatments in the press. It will be apparent that the viewpoint 
and technique of one newspaper w.ill be very different from an­
other, but if you appreciate that the vagaries, the irresponsibilities, 
the over-simplifications of the press go back to the· idea of free 
and diverse opinions, you will be more tolerant and will se.e that any 
effort to generalize or to standardize the· press will be a technique 
pointed in the totalitarian direction and would lead us away from 
-our greatest source of strength which is our cantankerousness and
our unwillingness to accept standardized concepts. I am deeply
confident that techniques of study and of working out problems
here, as in every other well conducted American institution, will be
based on constant reexamination of ideas. That is part and parcel
of our public information system.
Freedom of the American press depends upon diversity. 
Your relationship to the press will depend upon the recognition 
of its importance to the public and of its value to you. There 
is no chance of a meeting of minds between the East and the West 
on so fundamental a matter of principle as this matter of public 
information, but we in the West must not be victims to totalitar-
22 
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ian thinking to such an extent that we will deny the people the 
diversity of information which will enable them to go forward, 
which will enable them constantly to reexamine, to criticize and 
to grow strong through self-examination and self-criticism. 
In two. wars, the two greatest and most tragic wars of his­
tory, the United States Navy was headed by newspaper publishers­
Secretary Daniels 'and Secretary Knox. After the First World 
War the Navy became involved in the most extensive disarmament 
program in our national experience. After the Second World War 
the Navy ran into an economy wave which had for a time very 
grave consequences. These two experiences would seem to indi­
cate that there is still a very large unsolved problem about the pub­
lic's information concerning its armed services despite enormous 
efforts and real progress. It is fair to conclude that that prob­
lem has not yet been adequately solved. I repeat, take seriously 
the opportunity of getting closer to the public through the media of 
public information. I believe that every officer should be conscious 
of the significance of this task, not as an onerous chore, not as an 
undignified and unworthy type of dissemination of propaganda, 
put rather as an enormous opportunity to be responsive to the need 
and the right of people to know everything which will not be a 
positive danger. 
Now as I said before, I think you have to work primarily 
against a viewpoint which rightly and almost instinctively holds 
that it is safer not to talk too much. One has to be aware and 
conscious at all times that along side of this important obligation 
must go the requirement to do a better job of breaking down the 
barriers of ignorance by giving the American people more informa­
tion with which to grow through conflict and diversity, criticism 
and reexamination; to grow into an appreciation of the world res­
ponsibilities which have become ours. This relationship of pub-
23 
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lie information to the future of peace or war in the world is sim­
ple to understand. It is simple but the people of the United 
States must understand the importance of a strong national de­
fense of arms adequate to maintain our duty and obligation in this 
storm-tossed world. Unless the American people do adequately 
understand these necessities the dangers of war are doubled and 
trebled. If the American people do understand the necessity of 
strength at this time, if instead of some vague and ignorant concept 
based largely on fear they understand that our rearmament pro­
gram of today is not a war program but a peace program, then, in­
deed, there is a possibility of maintaining peace in the world. 
At Geneva in our small way we ran the gamut of relation­
ships with the Eastern Bloc. American diplomacy since the war 
has not been very shrewd or successful in its relationship with the 
Eastern Bloc but certain fundamentals had managed to seep 
through. As we pr�pared our tactics for the Geneva conference 
we decided that the basic thing was to take a very strong, almost a 
provocative, position at the outset, to maintain it throughout and 
to get the jump on every single point where we could get our pro­
posals, our ideas and our policies in first. The chief American 
delegate at the opening session of that conference made an ex­
tremely strong and provocative speech which completely changed 
the tone of the conference. The Russians immediately turned con­
ciliatory, placating and appeasing. They sought to weedle around 
the middle group nations to support an appeasing attitude. Every 
time we came in strong the air cleared, and the Eastern delegates 
had to appeal for some form of conciliation, some form of com­
promise. We maintained to the end a refusal to compromise, say­
ing it was impossible to compromise in a field of basic principles. 
Now that teaches us a lesson that the American people 
ought to understand. The American people are being appealed to 
today by various individuals who know that the American people 
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want peace. •It is perfectly obvious that the American people want 
peace but not at any price. We want to insure peace but our ex­
perience at Geneva proved to us again that the way to insure peace 
is through strength, vigor and capacity; to lay down a position 
and to maintain it. 
The American people have not altogther understood that. To 
the American people a rearmament program sometimes seems a 
war-like program. I believe that the undeviating informational 
line of the armed services should be : that our rearmament program 
is a peace program, not a war prog�am; that it is the only basis 
on which we can hope, at this stage of human and world experi­
ence, to insure peace; that the sacrifice and expenditures which 
the American people are being called upon to make are not expendi­
tures in the interests of war but rather expenditures in the interests 
of preserving the peace and that the program of appeasement which 
Mr, Henry Wallace, for example, is presenting to the American 
people and to which he is getting a response, is due to the basic 
craving of the American people to avoid a Third World War, a 
craving which is perfectly sound and right but based upon ig­
norance. 
The whole problem of peace comes down to this problem 
· of dispelling fears by letting the American public see that the
necessity for supp<;>rting a rearmament program is not because
we are afraid of the Russians or of anyone else, but because it is
the way to achieve peace at this time. Public int�rest on this sub­
ject will not be dispelled through silence but will be dispelled
through a responsive attitude toward the need of the public to
know everything that it possibly can. If any chances are taken
they must be taken on the side of knowledge rather than on the
side of ignorance.
25 
17
Canham: The Armed Forces and Public Information in War and Peace
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
I believe that this opportunity can be seized and that we do 
have a chance to achieve a stable world. It is a necessity to carry 
through this kind of information program if the armed forces are 
to preserve their rightful place as pillars in the temple of peace. 
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